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Abstract 
 
This paper identifies the regulatory synergies that can be realised between the WTO 
GPA and the growing number of RTAs with public procurement chapters that include 
provisions to control corruption. It submits that despite the multiplicity of 
international procurement agreements being negotiated outside of the WTO GPA, the 
relationship between the different agreements has more potential to produce a 
beneficial ‘accumulation’ of global regulatory enhancements than a system-damaging 
‘fragmentation.’2  
 
This paper highlights the discernible convergence in the design of international 
procurement systems, as reflected in both the WTO GPA and leading RTAs. The 
general principles of these commitments – whether at the regional or plurilateral level 
- reflect the growing acknowledgement that transparent, competitive and accountable 
government procurement systems benefit economic development, good governance 
and effective policy implementation. And this, in and of itself, may encourage 
inbound FDI and further economic and social development. These developments 
indicate a widespread understanding that ensuring good government procurement 
processes has a developmental significance that transcends its magnitude as an aspect 
of economic activity.3 
 
 
  
                                                        
1 Kamala Dawar is a Lecturer in International Commercial Law at Sussex University School 
of Law, Politics and Sociology. This paper is based on a draft presented at the WTO 
Symposium on Government Procurement September 2015, and a seminar at the University of 
Nottingham Law School Public Procurement Seminar Series, October 2015. The author is 
grateful for all the comments received at these events. 
2 Richard E. Baldwin, 2006. "Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building 
Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade," The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 
29(11), pages 1451-1518, November. James H. Mathis Regulatory regionalism in the WTO: 
Are ‘deep integration’ processes compatible with the multilateral trading system? ), in S. 
Lester, B. Mercurio, L. Bartels (eds), Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements: Commentary 
and Analysis, (Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
3 See for example, Sue Arrowsmith Robert D. Anderson. The WTO Regime on Government 
Procurement: Challenge and Reform (2011) Cambridge University Press. Anderson R.D. The 
WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: an emerging tool of global integration and 
good governance. EBRD Law in Transition online. October 2010. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Alongside a convergence in internationally accepted principles for procurement 
systems, there are nevertheless an increasing number of international agreements 
being negotiated that include legal provisions to regulate public procurement markets. 
Any convergence and increased acceptance of certain principles to underpin public 
procurement systems is evidently not leading in a linear manner to the negotiation of 
a single multilateral agreement committed to these values. On the contrary, both the 
number of RTAs including public procurement rules is expanding, as well as the 
number of signatory and observer parties to the plurilateral WTO GPA.  This 
expansion indicates an appetite for further liberalisation of public procurement 
markets among governments. Moreover, this is despite the slowdown in the 
negotiation of broader multilateral trade commitments in the WTO within the 
framework of the Doha Negotiating Round.  
 
This paper first submits that there is little potential to realise market access synergies 
between the WTO GPA and in those RTAs with substantive procurement 
commitments. It argues that due to the strict and conditional nature of reciprocity in 
market access concessions under both the WTO GPA and RTAs, the fears of trade 
diversion over trade creation are somewhat misleading. The negotiation of market 
access concessions is highly bilateral in nature; the MFN clause is applied 
conditionally on the basis of strict reciprocity. This implies that synergies between 
plurilateral and bilateral market access commitments are unlikely.  
 
The paper then examines the potential synergies that can emerge from the non-market 
access regulatory provisions of these agreements. It focuses on the recent and 
unprecedented incorporation of provisions to promote good governance and control 
corruption in procurement practises.  
 
The paper contends that these synergies occur not from the operation of the governing 
MFN provision, but - more importantly - from the non-discriminatory nature of the 
regulatory policy itself as implemented. While some regulatory processes do not 
easily lend themselves to open MFN for third parties or multilateral application, those 
relating corruption control have some characteristics that may well lend themselves to 
multilateralization – and could be characterised as so-called global public goods. This 
argument underlines the leading contention of this paper: international government 
procurement agreements operate to promote good government procurement processes, 
and this has a developmental significance that transcends its magnitude as an aspect 
of economic activity. 
 
This paper concludes that consequently, the WTO GPA and RTAs with government 
procurement chapters are more a complement than a hindrance to each other in their 
mutual efforts to bring good government procurement practices and the dynamic of 
competition to public procurement markets. Notwithstanding this, to concentrate on 
RTAs to the exclusion of the WTO GPA would be to forgo tangible benefits. 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
2. Market Access Synergies 
 
Government procurement negotiations, like most trade negotiations, are designed to 
promote mutually-agreed upon reductions of trade barriers - through the reciprocity 
principle and non-discrimination. Reciprocity is the rule by which the negotiating 
parties manage to maintain a balance and symmetry of treatment by granting the same 
or equivalent rights and benefits to each other.  Generally speaking, there are two 
main types of reciprocity: open or unconditional, and restrictive or conditional. Open 
reciprocity does not demand any direct response to an antecedent action. It rather 
imposes on the receiving side a certain obligation for repayment in the future. This 
characterises the negotiations followed under the GATT. Restrictive reciprocity on 
the other hand, places much greater emphasis on a simultaneous exchange of strictly 
equivalent benefits and or obligations. This latter approach characterises the 
negotiations followed under both the plurilateral WTO GPA and RTAs.  
 
The principle of MFN serves as a primary defence against trade discrimination. The 
success of the GATT was that the MFN obligation embodied in GATT Article I.1 has 
obliged all parties to extend to all other parties, immediately and without 
discriminatory conditions, the most favourable trade market access concessions it has 
granted, or may grant to any third party. This is an unconditional obligation to offer 
MFN to all Members without regard to equal participation in the exchange of market 
access concessions or even when reciprocity is violated. The lack of incentives to 
reciprocate has been thought to cause a free rider problem, which in turn may have 
undermined the attractions of expanding WTO multilateral agreements in other trade 
areas, such as procurement.  
 
 
2.1 Market Access Reciprocity and MFN under the WTO GPA 
 
In order to avoid the free rider problem, the MFN provisions negotiated within the 
WTO’s plurilateral agreements require only conditional treatment. Under all the 
various plurilateral Codes, including the Government Procurement Code - non-
discriminatory treatment was made conditional on an explicitly reciprocal exchange 
of rights and obligations, including access concessions among members of the 
agreement. Thus, from the outset, the plurilateral procurement Code was an example 
of an agreement that places market access concessions on a strictly reciprocal and 
conditional MFN basis. Despite the obvious limitations of liberalizing markets 
internationally on a conditional MFN basis, it must be acknowledged that in 
establishing a plurilateral agreement, the signatory parties were still seeking to 
promote an expansion of trade that would not otherwise have been acceptable under 
the GATT, with its non-reciprocal and unconditional non-discrimination 
requirements.  
 
The strictness of the reciprocity principle and conditionality of the GPA MFN 
obligation is formally set out in the Appendix to the Agreement. The coverage of the 
agreement is set out for each signatory party in Appendix I, which is itself divided 
into Annexes concerning the specific coverage of the obligations. 4  The Annexes 
                                                        
4 The Annexes address 1) central government entities covered by the Agreement; 2) covered 
sub-central government entities; 3) "other" covered entities (e.g. utilities); 4) goods; 5) 
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typically also contain General Notes in Annex 7, which further qualify the application 
of the Agreement.  The Annexes are negotiated along four basic parameters consisting 
of: i) the value of procurement – covering only contracts estimated to exceed a certain 
value threshold, ii) the identity of the procuring entity – covering only those listed by 
each party in its annexes, iii) the type of goods or services procured – consisting of all 
goods, apart from some expressly excluded by each party, and only services listed by 
each party in its annexes; and iv) the origin of the goods or services – including only 
countries that are GPA parties.5  
 
GPA market access negotiations are consequently highly complex. They are 
constructed on a request-and-offer approach where an initial offer from all the parties 
is submitted to the GPA Committee. On the basis of those submissions, the parties 
start bilateral negotiations. Additionally, under the GPA negotiations, not only must 
the parties decide which services and goods and construction are covered by the 
obligations, but they must also negotiate which contracting authorities or entities will 
be included in Annex I-III. Then they must also set the value of the thresholds that 
will trigger the scope of application of the agreement in each case and category of 
procurement. The GPA does not include an Annex to limit the application of 
restrictions to the MFN principle.  
 
In sum, under the GPA the strict reciprocity and conditionality of the MFN clause 
elicits equivalent compensation and indicates that any market access benefits granted 
between initial parties will not automatically be extended to the other signatory 
parties. Derogations from MFN are sometimes accompanied with declarations that 
they will be withdrawn only when respective signatory has accepted that the other 
parties have given comparable access to its suppliers. For example, in Canada’s 
General Note 6 to its Appendix 1 Annexes, it states that: 
 
  
6. This Agreement covers services specified in Annex 5 and construction 
services specified in Annex 6 with respect to a particular Party only to the 
extent that such Party has provided reciprocal access to that service.6 
 
 
This use of restrictive reciprocity and conditional MFN is a means to open up foreign 
markets and secure equality of opportunities in specific markets, while protecting 
against limitless liberalisation. Indeed, the OECD has estimated that if commitments 
were to be applied on an unconditional MFN basis among GPA parties, the average 
level of commitments would be 16% higher than under strict reciprocity.7  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
services coverage; 6) coverage of construction services and 7) General Notes. See: https://e-
gpa.wto.org/report/coverage 
5  Arie Reich, The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: The Pitfalls of 
Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity’. 31. Journal of World Trade, 1997:125. 
6 See report generated at https://e-gpa.wto.org/report/coverage 
7 High impacts (more than 25 percentage points) are observed in space transport services and 
banking services, while there is relatively no impact in construction services. See: Asako 
Ueno. Multilateralising Regionalism on Government Procurement. OECD Trade Policy Paper 
No. 151. 2014 p. 16. 
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2.2 Market Access and MFN under RTAs with Public Procurement Provisions 
 
Those RTAs with market access commitments for public procurement follow the 
same pattern of negotiating on a strictly reciprocal and conditional MFN basis. 
Research comparing the commitments under the WTO GPA and RTAs tends to 
conclude that generally, RTAs do not exceed the GPA except in very limited areas.8 
The stress on strict reciprocity and conditional MFN at both the regional and 
plurilateral level means that oftentimes, deeper commitments in one sector are 
counterbalanced by less coverage in other sectors. There are exceptions to this, most 
notably among certain Latin American countries that are not signatory parties to the 
GPA. 
 
Under RTAs, signatory parties are also reluctant to grant unconditional MFN 
treatment in their procurement chapters. This is particularly among WTO GPA 
parties, as discussed in Section 2.1. Third-party MFN clauses are not found in the 
government procurement chapters of the OECD member RTAs reviewed.9 This is 
presumably due to concerns about non-reciprocity and free-riding. Third-party MFN 
clauses stipulate that the preferential treatment granted in one agreement should in 
some cases be extended to parties in other agreements. They thus tend to limit 
discrimination among trading partners within RTAs by extending the better treatment 
of new RTAs to other parties of earlier RTAs.  
 
 
  
                                                        
8 Anderson, Robert D., Claudia Locatelli, Anna Caroline Müller and Philippe Pelletier (2014). 
"The Relationship between Services Trade and Government Procurement Commitments: 
Insights from Relevant WTO Agreements and Recent RTAs," WTO Working Paper ERSD-
2014-21. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201421_e.pdf. 
9 Asako Ueno, 2014. Op Cit. 
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3. Regulatory Synergies: the WTO GPA and RTAs 
 
In the WTO 2011 Annual Report on preferential trade agreements, a survey of over 
97 agreements noted that some regulatory activities do not lend themselves to 
implementation approaches on a preferential basis. 10  For example, if a country 
establishes a new competition law due to its RTA commitments, the enforcement of 
this law will not discriminate either in favour or against foreign firms because there is 
nothing inherently externally preferential in the design of a competition law. The 
provisions usually involve applying a competition law or setting up a competition 
authority. The enforcement of competition law improves the contestability of 
domestic markets for both domestic and foreign firms regardless of whether or not 
they are covered by an RTA. Transparency requirements to publish all relevant laws 
and regulations promoting competition will consequently be available to both RTA 
and non-RTA members.11  
 
There is also a good intuitive case for the proposition that the public procurement 
provisions related to good governance and corruption control also produce a more 
dynamic synergy, unlike those related to market access considerations. This section 
tests this proposition for the RTA and GPA public procurement governance 
requirements, specifically corruption control.12  
 
 
3.1 The WTO and corruption control  
 
It is widely accepted that corruption is “a plague that seriously undermines 
development globally, diverting resources that could be harnessed to finance 
development, damaging the quality of governance institutions, and threatening human 
security.” 13  Government procurement processes are particularly vulnerable to 
corruption partly due to the sheer volume involved. When governments purchase 
goods or supplies, they interact with the private sector financially, opening up various 
possibilities for reaping high rewards through corrupt behaviour. Several studies 
suggest that an average of 10-25 per cent of a public contract’s value may be lost to 
corruption.14 Given that government procurement accounts for 15-20% of GDP, it is 
clear how much damage corruption can do to economic and social wellbeing if such 
leakage accounts for as much as a quarter of a domestic procurement budget.  
 
The WTO legal framework embodies several underlying principles of relevance to the 
prevention of corruption, most notably: non-discrimination, transparency, 
predictability and limitations to arbitrary unilateral action. WTO disciplines can 
generally be seen to contribute positively towards anti-corruption efforts through 
                                                        
10 WTO Annual Report 2011. Found at: 
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep11_e.pdf 
11 Dawar, Kamala and Holmes, Peter (2011) Competition Policy. In: Preferential Trade 
Agreement Policies for Development: A Handbook. World Bank.  
12 This article defines corruption as the abuse of power for private gain. 
13 The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, Article 33. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf 
14 UNDOC. Guidebook on anti-corruption in public procurement and the management of 
public finances Good practices in ensuring compliance with article 9 of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption. 
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Members enforcing their WTO non-discrimination obligations and thereby reducing 
the opportunities and motivations for corruption in international transactions. For 
although discrimination might not be a corrupt practice per se, the awarding of 
government procurement contracts on the basis of whether a bribe has been paid 
rather than on the merits of the bid, is clearly contrary to the spirit as well as the 
requirements of non-discrimination.  
 
Promoting a more transparent regulatory environment and open administrative 
practices can also affect corruption. For not only will firms better know their 
regulatory rights and obligations, but transparency changes the ex ante risks of 
conducting corruption practices and increases accountability after the event. Both 
serve to make corruption less rewarding. In sum, a more transparent, predictable and 
less arbitrary international regulatory environment will also operate to reduce 
corruption in the domestic economic arena.  
 
However, these provisions are only indirectly relevant. Yet corruption directly - and 
negatively - affects markets. It operates as a hidden surcharge and is equivalent to a 
tariff on goods and services. It forges clandestine monopolies or oligopolies that 
reduce market contestability, distort competition and perniciously manipulate the 
decision making processes through which goods or services are chosen. Yet for fear 
of the political rather than economic ramifications perhaps, until the adoption of the 
Revised WTO GPA the relevance of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to 
directly address corruption was limited by the lack of explicit reference to corruption 
commitments. This omission reflected an all pervasive conservatism towards 
cooperation in corruption control at the government level. 
 
This section submits that the Revised WTO text represents an important watershed in 
international corruption control. Its signatory parties have abandoned previous legal 
caution and have incorporated provisions that explicitly recognize the need to stop 
corrupt practices from undermining procurement practices and furthermore, obligate 
the parties to prevent such practices.  
 
 
 
 
3.2 The WTO GPA and Corruption Control  
 
The Revised WTO GPA includes immediate reference to corruption control and other 
good governance issues in its preamble. The preamble indent six incorporates the 
principles and standards set out in international corruption control instruments and as 
discussed in Section 4, it contains a specific reference to the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC): 
 
Recognizing the importance of transparent measures regarding government 
procurement, of carrying out procurements in a transparent and impartial 
manner and of avoiding conflicts of interest and corrupt practices, in 
accordance with applicable international instruments, such as the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption 
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While the preamble does not contain any obligations that bind the WTO GPA parties, 
the General Rule of Interpretation contained in Article 31.2 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) stipulates that for the purposes of the interpretation of 
a treaty, the context comprises of the text including its preamble and annexes, and (a) 
any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by 
one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by 
the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.15  
 
This unprecedented preambular reference to corruption control in the WTO signals 
that the parties are ready to formally recognise the importance of the objectives of 
UNCAC and prevent corruption in the context of government procurement. The WTO 
dispute settlement body has also confirmed that the language in the preamble reflects 
the intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement, adding colour, texture and 
shading to any interpretation of the agreements.16 Consequently, any interpretation of 
WTO GPA provisions must be appropriately read with the anti-corruption perspective 
embodied in preamble indent six. 
 
Of more legal significance are the general principles of the agreement set out under 
Article IV.4. These now include much stronger good governance and corruption 
control provisions for the conduct of procurement:  
 
 
Article IV.4  
A procuring entity shall conduct covered procurement in a transparent and 
impartial manner that:  
 
(a) is consistent with this Agreement, using methods such as open tendering, 
selective tendering and limited tendering;  
(b) avoids conflicts of interest; and  
(c) prevents corrupt practices.  
 
[emphasis added] 
 
 
Pursuant to Article IV.4(c) and in the light of the objective and purpose of the 
preamble, GPA parties are provided with the legal possibility to hold one another to 
account for a corrupt measure that nullifies or impairs the benefits that it can 
legitimately expect under its procurement schedules. The enforcement of Article 
IV.4(c) can be sought both in the WTO by parties to the WTO GPA see Section 3.3. 
In addition to this, under the WTO GPA, private parties are also provided with a right 
to redress a corrupt tender at the domestic level. 
 
 
                                                        
15 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-
English.pdf 
16 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R. para. 153. 
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3.3 WTO GPA Article XVIII Domestic Review Procedures 
 
The obligation to provide domestic recourse to private parties through a bid challenge 
mechanism that is mandatory for the WTO GPA parties, pursuant to Article XVIII.1: 
 
 
Each Party shall provide a timely, effective, transparent and non-discriminatory 
administrative or judicial review procedure through which a supplier may 
challenge: 
a a breach of the Agreement;  or 
b where the supplier does not have a right to challenge directly a breach 
of the Agreement under the domestic law of a Party, a failure to 
comply with a Party’s measures implementing this Agreement, 
 
arising in the context of a covered procurement, in which the supplier has, or has 
had, an interest. 
[Emphasis added] 
 
 
The bid review mechanism offers an essential tool through which domestic suppliers 
can self-police the procurement tendering system. It fulfills many important functions 
including: due process, a right to be heard, accountability of procurement officials and 
agencies and an opportunity to view the procurement file. All in all, a strong bid 
challenge mechanism improves the reputation of the procurement process and reduces 
barriers to entry caused by poor perception of the process.17   
 
Yet there are various limitations to the use of domestic review mechanisms to control 
corruption. If the domestic context has weak rule of law or fragile governance 
structures, it will prima facie, undermine the operation of an independent and 
enforceable bid challenge mechanism. Other obstacles arise from different domestic 
legal systems and traditions. For example, the OECD has pronounced a relatively 
high degree of professionalism and enforcement in the UK procurement system, 
which gives effect to the EC procurement regime in four separate regulations. The 
Courts have all the necessary powers to grant interim or final injunctions. The basis 
for awarding damages is left for the Court to decide and may, for example, relate to 
tendering costs, lost opportunity or lost profit.  
 
Nevertheless, as seen in the case of Honeywell v Meydan Group demonstrates, 
English public policy has developed in a manner that might not be wholly conducive 
to corruption control in procurement contracts.18 In this dispute, the Court held that a 
contract tainted by illegality with regard to performance – such as a contract to 
commit fraud - is against English public policy and is consequently not enforceable. 
However, the Court also held that a contract induced by bribery is not necessarily 
                                                        
17 D. Gordon, “Constructing a Bid Protest System: The Choices that Every Procurement 
Challenge System Must Make” (2006) 35 Public Contracts Law Journal 427. Nicholas, 
Caroline (2009): “Remedies for breaches of procurement rules and the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Procurement” in: Public Procurement Law Journal, No. 4, pp. 151–159. 
18 Honeywell ([2014] EWHC 1344 TCC) 
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contrary to English public policy. That is, in seeking to avoid providing a tactical 
shelter for parties wishing to avoid enforcement by separating the corruption - which 
it was said tainted the underlying contract - from the arbitral proceedings themselves, 
which were not impugned, the Court nevertheless de facto recognized the legality of a 
procurement contract that was won through a bribe. 
 
The experience of investment tribunals is also instructive. Investment arbitrators are 
getting close to recognizing a defense to State BIT liability that, in effect, obligates 
investors to avoid involvement in public corruption in the course of making a treaty-
protected investment. The difficulty in these cases is that for public relations reasons, 
the parties often prefer to resolve such disputes without a tribunal. In the Siemens AG 
and Argentina case, for example, the tribunal did not have an opportunity to rule on 
the legal consequences of the well-supported bribery allegations. This wrongdoing 
emerged when Siemens was initially awarded $218 million for Argentina’s 
expropriation of its investment. However, following convincing allegations of 
Siemen’s bribery of Argentine officials to procure the investment, both parties 
announced that they were discontinuing their ICSID proceedings, and abandoned both 
the annulment and revision processes. Siemens agreed to decline its initial $218m 
award. This was probably motivated at least in part by the broader public relations 
costs of having the allegations of corruption remain in the public eye. As a result, it 
was left unclear as to whether investments procured by fraud do or do not fall within 
the scope of protected investments of the applicable BIT, or whether the tribunal 
would have either declined jurisdiction or refused to recognize the corrupt party’s 
substantive treaty-based rights. 
 
Nevertheless, if a privately brought procurement case alleging corruption seems 
unlikely to be resolved at the domestic level, the parties to the WTO GPA also have 
the right to bring any matter relating to covered procurement to the WTO’s State-to-
State dispute settlement mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
3.3 State-to-State Dispute Settlement in the WTO GPA 
 
Although the WTO GPA is a plurilateral agreement, standing outside the WTO 
Covered Agreements, if a WTO GPA party considers that another WTO GPA party is 
not in compliance with the obligations of the agreement, the general WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism is also applicable to the WTO GPA, pursuant to Article XX.2: 
 
Where any Party considers that any benefit accruing to it, directly or 
indirectly, under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired, or that the 
attainment of any objective of this Agreement is being impeded as the result 
of:  
(a) the failure of another Party or Parties to carry out its obligations 
under this Agreement; or  
(b) the application by another Party or Parties of any measure, whether 
or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement,  
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it may, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution to the matter, 
have recourse to the provisions of the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Dispute Settlement Understanding").  
[Emphasis added] 
 
The WTO GPA therefore incorporates by reference the provisions of the WTO DSU, 
notably Article 3.3 which provides for: 
 
The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any 
benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are 
being impaired by measures taken by another Member is essential to the 
effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance 
between the rights and obligations of Members. 
 
The WTO GPA Article XX.2 sets out two binding legal avenues for any WTO 
Member to hold another to account for a restrictive measure that nullifies or impairs 
the benefits it can legitimately expect under the WTO GPA. Most common it the 
violation claim. This arises if a government measure is in direct breach of an existing 
legal obligation under the WTO and another Member government considers that any 
benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the WTO is being nullified or 
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the agreement is being impeded if 
it is the result of the failure of another member government to carry out its obligations 
under the Agreement.  
 
As of the Revised text of the WTO GPA, nullification and impairment of benefits 
now includes the failure of another government to carry out its obligations to conduct 
the procurement contracts scheduled under its Annexes in a transparent and impartial 
manner that prevents corrupt practices, pursuant to Article IV.4(c). Whereas in the 
GPA 1994, transparency was desirable to achieve liberalization and non-
discrimination, the Revised GPA goes much further, in recognizing the importance of 
transparent measures to avoid conflicts of interests and corrupt practices. Under 
GPA 1994 there were two grounds upon which procuring entities may exclude 
tenderers: bankruptcy and false declarations. The Revised GPA text added four more 
grounds for exclusion: deficiencies in prior contracts, serious crimes, professional 
misconduct and failure to pay taxes have been added to bolster its governance 
provisions.  
 
The standard assumptions of State responsibility, upon which the specific obligations 
of States exist, are the general concepts of attribution, breach, excuses, and 
consequences.19 These have been developed over the past decades by the International 
Law Commission (ILC) and were codified in the 2001 Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Under the general rule of 
international law, it is stipulated that only conduct attributed to the State at the 
international level is that of its organs of government, or of others who have acted 
under the direction, instigation or control of those organs, i.e. as agents of the State.20  
                                                        
19 J. Crawford. Oxford Public International Law. OUP 2015. 
20 I. Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, Part I (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1983), pp. 132–166; 
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The interpretation of governmental action under the WTO does not normally depart 
from the ILC’s 2001 codification.21 In the Japan-Film Case, the Panel raised the issue 
of State responsibility with regard to acts of individuals and private corporations, 
noting that Panels have been faced with making sometimes difficult judgments as to 
the extent to which what appears on the face to be private actions may nonetheless be 
attributable to a government because of some governmental connection to or 
endorsement of those actions. It concluded that it becomes difficult to establish bright 
line rules with regard to attribution, and this required approaching the issue on a case-
by-case basis.22  There have, however, been few occasions for any explicit reference 
to the general principles of international law because the issue of attribution in the 
WTO is mostly uncontested: Panels oftentimes examine government measures or 
instruments that are unquestionably attributed to the State, either by action or 
omission. Consequently, there is no need for any explicit reference to the general 
principles of international law.  
 
If a procurement corruption case were to be examined under the WTO DSM as a 
direct violation of Article IV.4(c), it is likely that reference to the ILC Draft Articles 
on attribution would be extensive. The commentary to the 2001 Draft Articles 
specifies that the underlying principle that operates as a ‘corollary’ to the general rule 
is that the only conduct to be attributed to the State at the international level is that of 
its organs and agents.23  Nevertheless, Article 11 of the 2001 ILC Draft also notes that 
the conduct of an individual or a group of individuals may exceptionally be attributed 
to the State in de facto situations where the individual was acting on behalf of the 
State, acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in 
carrying out the conduct’, or to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the 
conduct in question as its own. The ILC’s 2001 draft also indicates that according to 
international practice the conduct of government or other public officials acting in 
their official capacity is attributable to the State  
 
 
... even if, in the particular case, the organ exceeded its competence according 
to internal law or contravened instructions concerning its activity.24 
 
 
                                                        
21 See Villalpando, S.M. Attribution of Conduct to the State: How the Rules of State 
Responsibility May Be Applied within The WTO Dispute Settlement System. Journal of 
International Economic Law (2002) pp393-420.  
22 Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 
adopted on 31 March 1998 (WT/DS44/R), para 10.16. 
23 Commentary to Part One, Chapter II, para 3 (ILC Report (2001), para 81).  
24 ILC 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, set out under the provisions of Article 7 
Excess of authority or contravention of instructions, that “The conduct of an organ of a State 
or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall 
be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in 
that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions. The Commentary to 
the 2001 Draft Articles further notes that [...] “International responsibility is incurred by a 
State if damage is sustained by a foreigner as a result of unauthorized acts of its officials 
performed under cover of their official character, if the acts contravene the international 
obligations of the State.” 
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This implies that the acts of public officials requesting or accepting bribes might be 
covered by WTO GPA obligations, while the payment of bribes by private enterprises 
would not.  In this sense, governmental co-ordination or blessing of corruption or 
omission to prevent corruption in government procurement processes in any form 
could be construed to bring it within the ambit of WTO GPA Article IV.4 disciplines 
and consequently actionable under the WTO DSM. 
 
 
 
3.3.1 The non-violation nullification and impairment of benefits claim (NVNI) 
 
This legal avenue recognises that measures or developments could arise that while not 
a direct legal violation of any promise or market access commitment, nevertheless 
have the effect of nullifying or impairing the market-access benefits that a country 
could reasonably have anticipated from the negotiated outcome of a trade agreement. 
25  The purpose for this ‘rather unusual remedy’ is to encourage parties to make 
concessions; contracting parties must be given a right of redress when a reciprocal 
concession is impaired by another contracting party as a result of the application of 
any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the General Agreement. 26  
 
The non-violation clause and its’ associated remedies are set out under WTO DSU 
Article 26. This provision stipulates that along with the rules and procedures of the 
DSU, two clauses are included in Article 26.1(a) requiring that non-violation claims 
require a detailed justification and affirming that if a non-violating measures nullifies 
or impairs benefits, a government has no obligation to remove the offending measure, 
rather make a ‘mutually satisfactory adjustment.’ 
 
The use of this unusual provision has been infrequent. Panels have noted with 
reference to Article XXIII:1(b) that:  
 
 
“…WTO Members have approached this remedy with caution and, indeed, 
have treated it as an exceptional instrument of dispute settlement… The reason 
for this caution is straightforward. Members negotiate the rules that they agree 
to follow and only exceptionally would expect to be challenged for actions not 
in contravention of those rules.”27 
 
 
Another more practical reason for its infrequent use may be due to the difficulty in 
demonstrating a non-violation case. Various panels have established that the burden 
of proof falls on the complaining party,28 along with the three-element requirement 
for a non-violation case under Article XXIII.1(b).29 Normally, non-violation cases 
                                                        
25  GATT Dispute: European Economic Community - Payments and Subsidies Paid to 
Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins ("EEC – 
Oilseeds") Panel Report. Adopted 25 January 1990, BISD 37s/86 para 185. 
26 EEC – Oilseeds Ibid, para. 144. 
27 Panel Report Japan — Film, Para. 10.36. 
28  Japan - Film, At Paragraph 10.41, citing: EEC - Oilseeds, para 142-152 and Australian 
Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, BISD II/188, 192-193. 
29 See Panel Report Japan — Film, para. 10.32; and Panel Report EC — Asbestos, para. 8.278 
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will involve an examination as to whether there is:  (1) an application of a measure by 
a WTO Member; (2) a benefit accruing under the relevant agreement; and (3) 
nullification or impairment of the benefit due to the application of the measure that 
could not have been reasonably expected by the exporting Member.”30 In Japan-Film, 
the Panel Report’s interpretation of a ‘measure’ was broad, for it:  
 
 
… need not necessarily have a substantially binding or compulsory nature for 
it to entail a likelihood of compliance by private actors in a way so as to 
nullify or impair legitimately expected benefits within the purview of Article 
XXIII.1(b).  
 
 
This interpretation is logical: for if the requirement was a binding measure, it would a 
priori fall under the purview of Article XXIII.1(a) as a violation or direct breach of a 
rule.  The Panel then sought to clarify that non-binding actions containing sufficient 
encouragement or dissuasion, can potentially have adverse effects on the conditions 
of market access. The Panel nevertheless confirmed existing GATT jurisprudence31 
by stipulating that these measures must be in some sense existing. The Panel found 
that in order for expectations of a benefit to be legitimate, the challenged measures 
must not have been reasonably anticipated at the time the tariff concession was 
negotiated.32  
 
The Panel Report of the Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement 
dispute 33  also examined a non-violation claim, but under the 1996 GPA Article 
XXII:2 non-violation nullification or impairment  provision. The US claimed that 
certain procurement practices of the Korean Airport Construction Authority 
(KOACA), and other entities concerned with the procurement of airport construction 
in Korea were inconsistent with Korea’s obligations under the WTO GPA. The US 
contended that KOACA and the other entities fell within the scope of Korea’s entities 
specified in Annex 1 of Appendix I of the GPA, yet the US was unable to bid for this 
contract and was also excluded from pursuing a claim in the domestic bid challenge 
mechanism.  
 
                                                        
30 DS163 Korea, Republic of — Measures Affecting Government Procurement. WT/DS163/7 
6 November 2000, Para 7.86. 
31 Panel Report US — Wool Shirts And Blouses, where the panel ruled on a measure that was 
revoked after the interim review but before issuance of the final report to the parties; Panel 
Report EEC — Measure On Animal Feed Proteins, where the panel ruled on a discontinued 
measure, but one that had terminated after the terms of reference of the panel had already 
been agreed; Panel Report United States — Prohibitions On Imports Of Tuna And Tuna 
Products From Canada, Para. 4.3, Where the panel ruled on the GATT consistency of a 
withdrawn measure but only in light of the two parties’ agreement to this procedure; Panel 
Report EEC — Restrictions On Imports Of Apples From Chile, where the panel ruled on a 
measure which had terminated before agreement on the panel’s terms of reference but where 
the terms of reference specifically included the terminated measure and, given its seasonal 
nature, there remained the prospect of its reintroduction. 
32 Panel Report Japan — Film, paras. 10.57-10.59 
33 DS163 Korea, Republic of — Measures Affecting Government Procurement. WT/DS163/7 
6 November 2000. 
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The Panel assessed that the claim was based on the frustration of reasonably expected 
benefits from alleged promises made during “negotiations” rather than nullification or 
impairment of actual concessions made. The Panel therefore found that the concept of 
non-violation could be extended to other contexts within the framework of principles 
of international law, such as those under Article 48 of the VCLT which is generally 
applicable to the performance of treaties and treaty negotiation – error in treaty 
formation.34 
 
Following the inclusion of provisions to obligate the parties to prevent corrupt 
practices in the conduct of procurement, government omission to prevent corruption 
from occurring within the covered procurements can no longer be reasonably 
anticipated under the WTO GPA. Indeed, both the Panels in both the Japan — Film 
and EEC — Oilseeds concluded that a specific measure could not be considered 
foreseeable solely because it was consistent with or a continuation of a past general 
government policy. That is, just because a procurement system was liable to 
corruption in the past, does not make it foreseeable under the WTO GPA.   
 
In Japan — Film, the Panel interpreted “nullification and impairment” to be akin to 
“upsetting the competitive relationship” between domestic and imported products and 
that any Complainant “must show a clear correlation between the measures and the 
adverse effect on the relevant competitive relationships.”35 It is clear that a corrupt 
procurement tender will upset competitive relationships directly and it is therefore 
conceivable that the WTO DSU will develop corruption control jurisprudence that do 
reflect some of the minimal 'norms' that are commonly shared. This avenue for 
enforcing the corruption control mechanisms included in the Revised WTO GPA 
conforms with Roessler’s conceptualization that non-violation nullification and 
impairment provisions are: 
 
 
… probably best seen as a clausula rebus sic stantibus similar to that in Article 
62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which States 
may terminate or withdraw from a treaty in the event of 'a fundamental change 
of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of 
the conclusion of the treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties.'36  
 
 
Non-violation claims have so far remained exceptional in complaining Members’ 
Panel submissions.  Staiger and Sykes have sought to account for the limited role of 
the non-violation claim. They note that the infrequent use of the provision is not 
compelled by treaty text and moreover that it is also difficult to identify the limits to 
                                                        
34 Under the VCLT Article 48. ERROR 1. A State may invoke an error in a treaty as 
invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty if the error relates to a fact or situation 
which was assumed by that State to exist at the time when the treaty was concluded and 
formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty. 2.  Paragraph 1 shall not 
apply if the State in question contributed by its own conduct to the error or if the 
circumstances were such as to put that State on notice of a possible error. 3. An error relating 
only to the wording of the text of a treaty does not affect its validity; Article 79 then applies. 
35 Panel Report Japan — Film, paras. 10.57-10.59 
36 F. Roessler. Should principles of competition policy be incorporated into WTO law through 
non-violation complaints? Journal of International Economic Law (1999) 2 (3): pp413-421.  
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non-violation claims in the case law. Staiger and Sykes do not see an undue burden in 
the provision’s requirement for a detailed justification. Their analysis is applicable to 
WTO GPA corruption control measures. For as with the Korea – Measures Affecting 
Government Procurement dispute, the complaining party could point to the state of 
affairs at the time of negotiations, which was the expectation of market access, and to 
the fact that some recent corrupt measure not readily foreseen ex ante, due to a change 
in government perhaps without a corruption control agenda, has significantly reduced 
market access relative to that state of affairs. Staiger and Sykes cannot see an obvious 
rationale why the non-violation remedy should be viewed as “exceptional.” They 
point to the possible relationship between non-violation cases and the distinction in 
international law between good faith and bad faith performance of treaty 
obligations.37   
 
In Korea — Measures Affecting Government Procurement, the Panel commenced by 
stating that ‘the non-violation remedy as it has developed in GATT/WTO 
jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles of customary 
international law. 38  The Panel explained this ‘non-violation remedy’ as the basic 
premise is that Members should not take actions, even those consistent with the letter 
of the treaty, which might serve to undermine the reasonable expectations of 
negotiating partners.  
 
 
…. In our view, this is a further development of the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda ... [which] is expressed in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention.39  
 
 
The Panel however made a clear distinction between non violation nullification and 
impairment, and good faith. It noted that while the overall burden of proof is on the 
complainant, this does not introduce a new requirement to affirmatively prove actual 
bad faith on the part of another Member. Rather, the affirmative proof should be that 
measures have been taken that frustrate the object and purpose of the treaty and the 
reasonably expected benefits that flow therefrom.  
 
The good faith principle implies that States must take the necessary measures to 
comply with the object and purpose of any treaty that it becomes a party to. And, 
moreover, Article 3 of the ILC’s 2001 Draft Articles further stipulates that a State 
cannot rely on its internal law as an excuse for not performing its international 
obligations.40 The use of good faith in corruption control in procurement processes 
has clearly not been strong enough to prevent such practices through dispute 
settlement. As Mitchell has argued, perhaps the principle of pacta sunt servunda has 
not be used so as to avoid overwhelming WTO provisions that appear to be based on 
                                                        
37  Staiger, Robert W. and Sykes, Alan O., Non-Violations (May 11, 2012). Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1983448 o 
38 This merged the categories of ‘general principles of law’ and ‘customary international law’ 
as reflected in ss 38(1)(c) and 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
respectively. 
39 DS163 Korea, Republic of — Measures Affecting Government Procurement. WT/DS163/7 
6 November 2000, para 7.93. 
40 Following the Alabama arbitration, See Crawford J. Oxford Public International Law 
(http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. 
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concepts similar to those underlying the principle of good faith, such as non-violation 
complaints.41 The existence or persistence of corrupt practices that are tolerated or 
deliberately ignored by a government could be interpreted as violations of WTO 
NVNI obligations that reach far beyond bad faith.  
 
Effective enforcement of the WTO GPA anti-corruption provisions requires that a 
complaining party whose benefits under these rules have been nullified or impaired 
by another Member. In turn, this requires that a given rule impart specific benefits on 
member countries, and that parties can identify the behaviour(s) of other countries 
that impair those benefits. This also requires enough specificity to quantify the value 
amount by which the benefit is impaired. A complaint must be accompanied by 
evidence that one or more transactions with certain values were lost by nationals of 
the complaining country to bribe-paying nationals of the offending country. The 
confidentiality of Panel hearings, obligated by DSU Article 14, could serve to 
encourage participants to be more forthcoming with making sensitive accusations and 
revealing sensitive information.
  
 
If the assertion is proven and the evidence found credible, the Panel would 
recommend that the offending member bring its practices into conformity with the 
requirements of the WTO GPA; if the offending party failed to do so, the complainant 
would be authorized to revoke concessions made to the offending country in an 
amount equal to the value of the transaction that was lost to corruption on the part of a 
public official.42 
 
  
                                                        
41 Mitchell, Andrew D. "Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement" (2006) 7(2) Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 339.  
42 Pursuant to WTO GPA Article XX.3, cross-retaliation under another of the WTO Covered 
Agreements is not permitted. 
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4. RTAs, Corruption Control and synergies with the WTO GPA 
 
An increasing number of references to both corruption control and good governance 
are evident in the more recent RTAs with procurement chapters. The OECD analysis 
of 47 RTAs with public procurement chapters, notes that the corruption control 
measures introduced in the revised GPA, such as anti-corruption measures are also 
covered by nearly half of the RTAs reviewed.43 This paper is based on the contention 
that the positive synergies that occur between the WTO GPA and RTAs occur not 
from the operation of the governing MFN provision, but rather from the non-
discriminatory nature of the regulatory policy itself. Provisions promoting corruption 
control, whether at the regional or plurilateral level, have characteristics that lend well 
to multilateralization – and could be characterised as so-called global public goods. 
This supports the intuitive case that the public procurement provisions related to 
governance offer a dynamic synergy that transcends the significance of market access 
considerations. 
 
A noteworthy example of such a synergy is the trade agreement between Canada and 
the EU, who are also both parties to the WTO GPA. They have chosen to incorporate 
Article IV WTO GPA into the CETA procurement chapter verbatim.44 Compare this 
to the earliest RTA procurement chapters, such as in the NAFTA. This agreement 
included comprehensive procurement provisions regulating how a tender should be 
made and how the qualifications of suppliers should be designed, yet makes no 
explicit mention of the need to prevent corruption, integrity, conflicts of interest or 
promote good governance in procurement matters. The one relevant provision, which 
is actually much closer to a good faith obligation, is provided under Article 1.4: No 
Party may prepare, design or otherwise structure any procurement contract in order to 
avoid the obligations of this Chapter.  
 
A later agreement, the EU-Ukraine DCFTA Chapter 8 on public procurement, 
includes one single provision under Article 151.5 to require that all contracts shall be 
awarded through transparent and impartial award procedures that prevent corruptive 
practices. This impartiality shall be ensured especially through the non-discriminatory 
description of the subject-matter of the contract, equal access for all economic 
operators, appropriate time limits and a transparent and objective approach.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum is the TPP procurement chapter. Here, Conditions for 
Participation set out under Article 15.8(4) note that if there is supporting material, a 
Party, including its procuring entities, may exclude a supplier on grounds such as: 
false declarations; significant or persistent deficiencies in the performance of any 
                                                        
43 See: Asako Ueno. Multilateralising Regionalism on Government Procurement. OECD 
Trade Policy Paper No. 151. 2014; Anderson, Robert D. and Pardo de Leon, Josefita and 
Pelletier, Philippe and Osei-Lah, Kodjo and Müller, Anna Caroline, "Government 
Procurement Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: A Stepping Stone to GPA 
Accession?" Prepared for publication in Arrowsmith and Anderson, eds. The WTO Regime 
on Government Procurement: Recent Developments and Challenges Ahead (2011). 
44 CETA Article IV Conduct of Procurement 4. A procuring entity shall conduct covered 
procurement in a transparent and impartial manner that: (a) is consistent with this Chapter, 
using methods such as open tendering, selective tendering and limited tendering; (b) avoids 
conflicts of interest; and prevents corrupt practices. 
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substantive requirement or obligation under a prior contract or contracts; or failure to 
pay taxes. While this may appear minimal it is complemented by Chapter 26, which 
exclusively and comprehensively covers transparency and anti-corruption. Chapter 26 
includes an obligation for all parties to ratify or accede to the UNCAC and to 
maintain measures to establish a comprehensive list of corruption matters that affect 
international trade to be considered as criminal offences under its law. Additionally, 
Article 26.9 on the Application and Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Laws also 
requires that no Party shall fail to effectively enforce its anti-corruption laws through 
a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction. This introduces an avenue for 
bringing both violation as well as non-violation nullification and impairment cases 
against corrupt procurement systems and individuals, as discussed in Section 3. 
 
There is a paucity of data to reveal how far regional commitments are implemented 
or, unlike the WTO DSM, how disputes are resolved in general. Nevertheless, both 
RTA and GPA agreements with corruption control provisions affect each other 
positively, resulting in a convergence of procurement procedures between RTAs and 
the GPA. This suggests a possibility for the further creation of network governance 
producing effective synergies to control corruption - despite it being created 
preferentially among the specific parties to each of the agreements.  
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5. Network Governance, Corruption Control and Global Public Goods 
 
Public goods are non-rivalrous and non-excludable because they can be enjoyed 
without depriving or excluding others. Providing clean air and a healthy environment 
is a public good because it is enjoyed by all without reservation. Corruption control is 
also non-excludable because those contributing to prevent corruption cannot exclude 
non-contributors from the positive outcomes, and it is non-rivalrous because one 
individual’s enjoyment from corruption free governance will not detract from anyone 
else’s ability to do so. The benefits of preventing corruption, typically in lowering 
transaction costs and facilitating more effective decision-making by economic agent 
are largely non-rivalous and non-excludable.  
 
The non-rivalrous and non-excludable nature of corruption control leads to the free-
rider problem. Oftentimes, governments are not prepared to pay the cost of something 
that others may be expected to benefit from; instead, they hope that someone else will 
pay for it and they will benefit for free. Domestic efforts to control corruption also 
face obstacles because corruption appears to occur more in national governments. For 
unlike international regimes, State’s have a monopoly over coercion as well as 
various services and administrative functions, including the public procurement of 
goods and services related to these functions. The difficulty with this is that as a 
consequence of State sovereignty, there is little supranational authority capable of 
effectively controlling corruption at the domestic level. A prisoner’s dilemma 
situation has prevailed whereby individual governments face a stronger incentive to 
continue to undermine efforts to cooperate in the control of corruption because of 
potentially high costs within their own jurisdictions, despite the widespread 
acknowledgement that all are is better off without the scourge of corruption. 
 
In such a context, coordinated trans-national efforts to control corruption face 
substantial commitment, monitoring, and enforcement problems.  Each individual 
government, or regional or international agreement faces its own shortcomings in 
addressing corruption. The WTO GPA, at the forefront of strengthening corruption 
control measures, faces a limited membership, with selective coverage of their 
procurement markets, which tend to reflect developed economies and a dispute 
settlement mechanism, which while binding, does not provide for third party 
enforcement of the agreement. It requires a complaining party to bring a case, which 
re-introduces the prisoner’s dilemma to corruption control enforcement.  
 
Nevertheless, the text of the WTO GPA is widely referenced, including in many 
regional agreements it provides a guiding template for the procurement chapters. The 
Revised WTO GPA text is further complemented by the first ever global agreement 
against corruption – the UNCAC – which it references in the WTO GPA preamble. 
The UNCAC sets out various mandatory provisions to address corruption in 
procurement and in public service generally, yet it does not have a binding dispute 
settlement mechanism to enforce the treaty. It is however, a widely accepted set of 
principles among both developed and developing countries, holding membership of 
140 parties and 178 signatories.45  
 
                                                        
45 As of January 1 2015, See: www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html 
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Also widely referenced is the 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law, which reflects 
international best practice and is designed to be appropriate for all States in assisting 
them in formulating a modern procurement law. While it provides domestic 
government purchasers discretion over what to purchase and how to conduct the 
procurement, this discretion is subject to safeguards consistent with other 
international standards again, most notably those imposed by the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). That is, all procedures are subject to 
rigorous transparency mechanisms and requirements to promote competition and 
objectivity and all decisions and actions taken in the procurement process can be 
challenged by potential suppliers.46  
 
Somewhat surprisingly, however, UNCITRAL contains no textual reference to 
corruption control, although this is implicit from the substance of the text. Article 21 
provides for the exclusion of a supplier or contractor from the procurement 
proceedings on the grounds of inducements from the supplier or contractor, an unfair 
competitive advantage or conflicts of interest. Moreover, Article 26 stipulates that a 
code of conduct for officers or employees of procuring entities shall be enacted and 
shall address, inter alia, the prevention of conflicts of interest in procurement and, 
where appropriate, measures to regulate matters regarding personnel responsible for 
procurement, such as declarations of interest in particular procurements and screening 
procedures. 
 
A network of organisations, agreements and anti-corruption initiatives is emerging 
and operating as a web to produce global public goods controlling corruption in 
procurement processes. This network operates through a complex web of soft and 
hard laws, referencing each other at the bilateral, regional, plurilateral and 
international level. 47  UNCITRAL Recital 4 calls for closer cooperation and 
coordination with other international organs and organizations active in the field of 
procurement law reform, and drafting history indicates that UNCAC Article 9 had a 
significant influence in the drafting of UNCITRAL’s Model Law. It calls for an 
independent domestic review mechanism to monitor conflicts of interest of public 
procurement officials. UNCITRAL Model Law implicitly provides the structured 
system of rules that UNCAC Article 9 demands. Meanwhile, the WTO GPA 
references UNCAC in the preamble and incorporates binding provisions to prevent 
corruption in Article IV. This provides a hard law framework importing soft law 
convention. It loosens the cautious restraints that are so often applied in anti-
corruption contexts, as in the UNCITRAL framework. That is, while each individual 
element in the network has specific advantages and deficiencies in preventing 
corruption, together they operate as a tightening noose, which is stronger than the sum 
of its individual parts. 
 
  
                                                        
46 UNCITRAL Model Law Article 64. 
47 For example: The OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention and related work; World Bank's Anti-
Corruption Knowledge Resource Centre; The UN Magnet - Management & Governance 
Network; UN Centre for International Crime Prevention; UNDP for Accountability and 
Transparency (PACT); Transparency International’s Global Coalition Against Corruption, 
See for example: www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/ 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Despite the on-going concern expressed at the proliferation of RTAs agreements and 
their potential to undermine multilateral efforts to regulate international trade, the 
governance provisions in the government procurement chapters’ in these agreements 
have notable synergies in their regulatory enhancements.  
 
Traditionally procurement reform and anti-corruption initiatives have followed 
separate tracks despite their obviously common purpose of ensuring sound 
government structures and practices. More latterly however, this more sophisticated 
web of regulatory instruments and tools are operating to generate global public goods 
and integrate sound procurement practices into a broader anti-corruption initiative, 
which ultimately is potentially enforceable through the WTO GPA provisions in the 
dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO itself. This confirms the contention that 
international public procurement agreements hold a development significance that 
transcends its market access objectives. 
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